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The Kurds favor the latter, whereas the regime desires 
the former. The Kurds appear to be open to any deal 
that will allow the SDF, or more accurately the People 
Protection Units (YPG) that forms the backbone of the 
SDF, to keep its autonomous organizational structure. 
In contrast, some in Washington with ties to the 
White House have entertained the idea of off-loading 
some of the United States’ roles and responsibilities 
in northeastern Syria on its Arab allies, particularly 
the members of the projected Middle East Strategic 
Alliance, a U.S.-initiated consortium of Gulf countries 
plus Egypt and Jordan. This group is driven by the 
goal of dual containment of Iran and Turkey. In a 
sense, it wants to limit the role of these two non-Arab 
countries  in what they frame as Arab affairs. Yet this 
group is too feeble and incoherent to play any such a 
role. 
The most discussed option has been a Turkish-U.S. 
bargain, yet Turkey’s strategic goal of rolling back 
and weakening the SDF’s gains and administrative 
structure are in contradiction to the goals set by the 
United States for its military withdrawal. These are 
continuing the fight against ISIS, protecting its allied 
Kurdish groups, and rolling back Iran’s influence in 
Syria. 
Strategic incoherence and geopolitical incompatibility 
have been the defining qualities of Turkish and 
U.S. policies in Syria. Their visions, goals and threat 
perceptions have been diverging. They have mistrusted 
each other’s local alliances, seeing them through the 
lenses of terrorism. By emphasizing the YPG’s organic 
links with the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK), which 
The United States’ decision to withdraw its troops 
from Syria has set off a scramble for northeastern 
Syria among regional and extra-regional powers. 
The tectonic plates have once again moved, power 
relations among actors have become subject to 
reconfiguration, and different visions for northeastern 
Syria have emerged. Turkey and its relationship with 
the United States are at the epicenter of these changes. 
Relations between them need to be reenergized in 
terms of strategy, tactics, and vision, yet divergence 
rather than convergence, and flexible alliances rather 
than a strategic partnership will continue to be the 
name of the game during 2019. Yet, at present, it 
appears the discussion on a safe zone in northeastern 
Syria will have a major impact on the Turkish-U.S. 
relations and the approach of major powers toward 
Syria in the upcoming period.
Actors and Strategies
Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime contend that 
northeastern Syria should come under the control 
of the latter. Though rejecting any enhanced form of 
autonomy or federalism, Russia supports a limited 
form of cultural and administrative autonomy for the 
Kurds in Syria. Such a scenario anticipates the Kurds 
handing over control of the border to the government 
and the Syria Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters being 
integrated into the Syrian security forces. Yet it is 
not clear whether by integration Russia means these 
forces joining the Syrian army as individuals or as an 
entity.
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is on the terrorist list of 
Turkey, the EU, and the 
United States, Turkey 
accused Washington of 
allying itself with the 
offshoot of a designated 
terrorist organization. In 
contrast, Brett McGurk, 
the former U.S. envoy for 
the anti-ISIS coalition, 
recently depicted Turkey-
allied Syrian opposition 
groups as being “marbled 
with extremists.” This line 
of thinking appears to be widely shared within the 
U.S. security and foreign policy establishment.
Though the Syrian conflict has aggravated 
Turkish-U.S. relations, it is not the sole cause of 
their downward trajectory. It is also a symptom of a 
deeper crisis in the relationship. Strategic decoupling 
and geopolitical incompatibility between the two 
countries have been real and ongoing for some time. 
The Cold War framework for their relations is not 
applicable anymore. At a time when the elite and 
institutional ownership of the relationship is fraying, 
the mistrust between Turkey and the United States is 
growing. 
Safe Zone through Flexible Alliances 
This mistrust has been glaringly visible during the 
discussion around a safe zone in northeastern Syria. 
Whereas the personal relationship between President 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Donald Trump is good 
and improving, the institutional gap between the 
two countries remains wide. The positive news for 
Turkey is that with each change in Trump’s cabinet, 
the gap between the president and his administration 
is fast disappearing. The downside is that Trump 
operates according to his impulses and instincts 
rather than to well-thought-out policy visions. His 
Twitter diplomacy is subject to constant changes. 
This highlights the necessity of reinvigorating the 
institutional ties and partnership between Turkey 
and the United States within a rectified framework.
Nevertheless, as a result of the strategic decoupling 
between the two countries, which has been 
aggravated by the weakening of the traditional 
elite and institutional ownership of their relations, 
Turkey has pursued “flexible alliances” in recent 
years. Relations with Russia and Iran are cases in 
point. From cooperation within the framework 
of the Astana and Sochi processes on Syria to the 
purchase of Russian S-400 missiles, there has always 
been an invisible third party in any Russian-Turkish 
engagement, namely the United States, that defined 
their nature and quality. Likewise, Turkish-U.S. 
interactions on Syria similarly involve Russia as an 
invisible third party that conditions, constraints and 
even shapes them.
However, the Trump-initiated discussion with Turkey 
on a safe zone is a process rather than a deal. This 
process is likely to be impacted by what appears to be 
institutional resistance in the United States against 
a swift and unplanned withdrawal, the geopolitical 
calculations of Turkey’s partners in the Astana 
process (particularly Russia), and the Syrian Kurds’ 
ongoing talks with the Assad regime. It will first have 
to involve the clarification of the nature of a safe 
zone, including its goal and working mechanism, as 
well as of the political vision for northeastern Syria. 
Such clarifications will reveal the nature of resistance 
to or acceptance of a safe zone. 
There are divergent expectations between different 
actors. For the SDF, a safe zone should primarily 
serve as a buffer protecting it from Turkey. For 
Turkey, a safe zone is a means to fight the YPG and 
weaken the administrative structures in the areas 
held by the SDF. For the United States, it is a way to 
find a modus vivendi between Turkey and the Syrian 
Kurds, and to ensure that Russia, Iran and the Assad 
regime will not fill the vacuum created as a result of 
its withdrawal. 
Russia is 
unlikely 
to oppose 
outright the 
idea of a safe 
zone to the 
point where 
it puts at risk 
its relations 
with Turkey. ”
“
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Three Trends
This process is likely to engender three trends. First, 
while seeking assurances from the United States 
and other international actors, the Syrian Kurds 
will also seek a deal with the Assad regime which is 
likely to have its own reasons for negotiations now. 
When Trump first announced the U.S. withdrawal, 
the regime was in no hurry to negotiate with the 
Kurds, believing that over time they would become 
weakened and hence less demanding. Yet with a safe 
zone, the regime risks losing control of its border and 
of the hydrocarbon sources located in northeastern 
Syria for a long time. To avert this, Assad now has 
more motivation for a negotiation with the Kurds, 
something that is promoted by Russia. Moreover, 
though the current discussion between the United 
States and Turkey revolves around the Syrian Kurds 
the question not only of which Kurds, but also which 
Arabs should participate in administrative and 
political structures in northeastern Syria is not easy 
to answer. The Arab allies of Turkey and the United 
States differ on this, with the latter being allied with 
the YPG and operating within the framework of the 
SDF.
Second, Russia is unlikely to oppose outright the 
idea of a safe zone to the point where it puts at risk 
its relations with Turkey. Instead, it is likely to situate 
this discussion within the larger framework of their 
relations and try to extract concessions from Turkey 
in other areas. At the same time, Russia will seek 
ways to dilute the content and depth of the safe zone 
discussion. Russia’s proposal during the recent Putin-
Erdogan meeting points to such a policy. Moscow 
advanced the idea of reinvigorating the Adana 
agreement of 1998 between Turkey and Syria as a 
way to address Ankara’s security concerns.1 Through 
this, Russia aims to achieve two goals: to re-establish 
relations between Turkey and the Assad regime, and 
to dilute the content and depth of the projected safe 
zone, as the Adana agreement focuses on border 
1 For the rationale and content of Adana agreement, see http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_
statement-made-by-ismail-cem_-foreign-minister_-on-the-special-security-meeting-
held-between-turkey-and-syria_br_october-20_-1998_br__unofficial-translation___p_.
en.mfa 
security rather than the creation of a safe zone inside 
Syria. Nevertheless, if the Turkish-U.S. engagement 
acquires the flavor of a process similar to the Astana 
one, Turkey will have to tread a fine line between both 
sides. 
Third, discussions about a safe zone could become 
more time-consuming and internationalized. Apart 
from Turkey and the United States, actors such as 
France and Britain will highly likely become part of 
the conversation. This, in turn, can put further stress 
on Turkish-U.S. relations. The idea of a safe zone, 
which is pushed by the United States to overcome an 
impasse and enmity between its two allies, Turkey 
and the SDF, can antagonize both and wreak havoc 
on northeastern Syria if it is not well planned and 
implemented. So far, the biggest loophole of the 
proposed safe zone is the lack of a well-articulated 
political vision for the area, if not Syria in general.
Flexible Alliances rather than 
Strategic Partnership
As the discussion about a safe zone illustrates, 
divergence rather than convergence prevails in 
Turkish-U.S. relations. Not only has the problem of 
trust arisen, which paved the way to the deepening 
of skepticism between two countries about their 
respective intentions, Turkey has also tended to 
prefer the establishment and implementation of 
flexible alliances with different actors in order to 
strengthen its position in the negotiations about the 
future of Syria and the region. This Turkish choice 
has become strategic insofar as it has begun to shape 
and frame the country’s proactive engagement with 
the region. From relations with Russia and Iran on 
Syria to relations with Iran and Iraq on the Kurdish 
referendum to relations with France, Germany, and 
Russia on Syria, flexible alliances seem to have been 
working in the interest of Turkey by enlarging its 
capacity and influence in the region. This in return 
will have a formative impact on Turkey’s relations 
with the United States and the transatlantic alliance, 
the shape and meaning of which is increasingly in 
flux. 
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